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Abstract
In the United States, several states have made policy decisions regarding whether and how to use familial
searching of the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database in criminal investigations. Familial searching
pushes DNA typing beyond merely identifying individuals to detecting genetic relatedness, an application
previously reserved for missing persons identifications and custody battles. The intentional search of CODIS for
partial matches to an item of evidence offers law enforcement agencies a powerful tool for developing
investigative leads, apprehending criminals, revitalizing cold cases and exonerating wrongfully convicted
individuals. As familial searching involves a range of logistical, social, ethical and legal considerations, states are
now grappling with policy options for implementing familial searching to balance crime fighting with its potential
impact on society. When developing policies for familial searching, legislators should take into account the impact
of familial searching on select populations and the need to minimize personal intrusion on relatives of individuals
in the DNA database. This review describes the approaches used to narrow a suspect pool from a partial match
search of CODIS and summarizes the economic, ethical, logistical and political challenges of implementing familial
searching. We examine particular US state policies and the policy options adopted to address these issues. The aim
of this review is to provide objective background information on the controversial approach of familial searching
to inform policy decisions in this area. Herein we highlight key policy options and recommendations regarding
effective utilization of familial searching that minimize harm to and afford maximum protection of US citizens.
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Introduction
The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database
was established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) to aid in the exchange of DNA profiles in forensics
investigations by facilitating data sharing and compari-
sons of short tandem repeat (STR) profiles at the local,
state and national levels. The DNA Identification Act of
1994, a subtitle of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, authorizes the Director of the
FBI to establish “an index of DNA identification records
of persons convicted of crimes, and analyses of DNA
samples recovered from crime scenes and from uniden-
tified human remains” [1]. The CODIS database soft-
ware facilitates DNA data sharing and comparisons of
STR profiles across the local, state and national levels
[2].
CODIS was originally intended to be utilized for the
investigation of violent crimes and sex offenses by using
exact matches between DNA evidence and DNA data-
base profiles to develop new investigative leads and to
aid in missing persons identifications [2]. States have set
their own standards and regulations governing when an
individual shall be profiled for inclusion in the database.
States also set their own policies and schedules regard-
ing the data entry and search schedules. Since 1994,
CODIS has been expanded in many states to include
profiles of nonviolent offenders and arrestees and has
become an invaluable tool for law enforcement in a vari-
ety of investigative contexts [3].
Recently, law enforcement agencies have successfully
used existing CODIS software to detect partial matches
through a low-stringency search, which allows for mis-
matches at some markers, in addition to absences and
dropouts allowed in moderate-stringency searches.
Investigators commonly use a low-stringency search of
CODIS when facing an evidence sample developed from
multiple sources or if the DNA evidence is of low qual-
ity [2]. Low-stringency searches also can identify biologi-
cal relatives by revealing genetic similarities between
individuals, which led to a nationwide call to use
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investigations, “familial searching” is defined as the
intentional search of an offender DNA database for
inexact matches between DNA evidence profiles and
offender and arrestee DNA profiles. Upon the identifica-
tion of one or more partial match profiles, law enforce-
ment may investigate purported family members of the
partial matches as suspects. Such familial searching has
identified and convicted suspects, allowed investigators
to reopen cold cases and exonerated wrongfully con-
victed individuals [5]. Additionally, familial searching
has led to three successful convictions in California and
Colorado and has resulted in leads in many more
ongoing cases [6].
In March 2008, the FBI determined that familial
searching policies should be decided by individual states
[7]. As of June 2011, California, Colorado, Texas and
Virginia had passed state legislation permitting familial
searching, and Maryland and Washington, DC, had
banned familial searching (see Table 1) [8-13]. Despite
individual states’ discretion, there is an expectation of
reasonable uniformity among states regarding the use of
CODIS [2]. To address this expectation, at least in part,
policymakers are considering a national platform that
would allow crime investigators to run familial searches
of CODIS. In July 2010, federal legislation (H.R.6011)
was introduced in the US House of Representatives to
authorize the FBI to conduct familial searches primarily
in cold case investigations of violent or sex crimes [14].
Familial searching has immense potential to help law
enforcement develop leads in investigations that would
otherwise go unsolved. This novel approach presents
both technical and logistical challenges for law enforce-
ment, however, and raises distinct ethical, social and
legal concerns. As policies governing familial searching
develop, policymakers, law enforcement agencies and
the public may consider options for improving the effec-
tiveness and reliability of familial searches, the potential
effects on society and families, the associated Fourth
Amendment implications, and the costs and benefits to
law enforcement. In this review, we examine the chal-
lenges presented by familial searching and the policies
adopted by some states to address these challenges.
Narrowing the suspect pool
For a familial search, investigators run a low-stringency
search with the intention of identifying a relative of the
perpetrator. Such a low-stringency search is most likely
to result in parent-offspring relationships, whereas sib-
ling and avuncular relationships (for example, cousins
Table 1 State policies for familial searching and partial match disclosure
States with formal familial searching
policies
Parameter California Colorado Texas Virginia
Proportionality
Violent crimes XX X X
Nonviolent crimes X
CODIS offenders searched
Convicted offenders XX X X
Arrestees XX X
Tools for narrowing suspect pool
IBS XX X X
Likelihood ratio XX X X
YSTR analysis XX X X
Other policy specifics
Requires profiles on all 13 CODIS loci X X X X
Requires evidence profile to be single source X X
Permits mixtures with clearly defined profiles X X
Oversight committee X
a X
b
Requires specialized training of law enforcement X
Requires public record verification before follow-up X
States permitting partial match disclosure [4]
Arizona, Connecticut
c, Florida, Missouri and Nebraska
d, Nevada, New York, Oregon and Washington
State
e, Wyoming
CODIS = Combined DNA Index System; IBS = identity-by-state; YSTR = Y-chromosome short tandem repeat.
aFamilial Search Committee.
bCommittee of four
CODIS analysts recommends when to conduct familial searches.
cRestricted to profiles where a genetic similarity “must raise the hair on the back of the analyst’s
neck to be worth pursuing” (Ram (2011) [4], p 770).
d“Targeted analysis” may be conducted on a case-by-case basis and upon specific request (Ram (2011) [4], p
772).
ePolicy addresses partial matches derived from routine moderate-stringency searches.
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search typically results in a list of multiple candidate
partial matches whose family members may eventually
be investigated further as suspects or persons of interest.
A perpetrator and a profiled offender are most likely
to share genetic similarities if they are close biological
relatives, but partial matches might also include random
unrelated individuals profiled in CODIS whose DNA
profiles are by chance similar to the evidence sample
profile. Consequently, when a familial search is per-
formed, the resulting suspect pool can contain from a
few up to hundreds or more suspects, depending on the
search parameters used, making the initial pool of
CODIS partial matches and their biological relatives too
large for a manageable investigation [15].
Additional analysis is necessary to verify relatedness
between the evidence profile and the partially matched
offender [3,15]. Taking measures to improve the reliabil-
ity of familial searching will maximize the efficiency of
investigations and limit unwarranted scrutiny on inno-
cent individuals. Several states have also adopted
approaches to narrow a suspect pool to a single or a
few candidate persons of interest.
Since the DNA Identification Act of 1994 does not
explicitly authorize familial searches at the federal level,
searches of the National DNA Index System (NDIS) are
not currently conducted [1,16]. Because moderate- and
low-stringency CODIS searches were originally intended
to match DNA profiles from evidence samples directly
to CODIS profiles, the search results do not statistically
rank partial matches or take into consideration allele
frequency. Likewise, the latest edition of the CODIS
database (CODIS 7.0) will not include familial searching
capabilities [17]. However, in March 2008, the Scientific
Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods
(SWGDAM) proposed protocols for pursuing inciden-
tally found partial matches and made recommendations
on further analysis to confirm relatedness [7].
Retesting Y-chromosome short tandem repeat markers
Retesting of evidence and candidate profiles for Y-chro-
mosome STR (YSTR) markers can greatly reduce the
number of coincidental matches in the suspect pool.
Because profiles in CODIS are predominantly males,
paternal relatedness between two profiles may often be
verified by YSTR analysis [3]. SWGDAM recommended
that YSTR typing be conducted on candidates identified
through a familial search of the DNA evidence [7,18]. In
California, YSTR typing of DNA evidence is completed
prior to the familial search request [9]. California, Col-
orado and Texas policies require YSTR analysis of male
candidate results to be conducted before identifying
information on the partial match profile is released to
investigators [9,11,12].
Mitochondrial DNA
Analysis of mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) serves a simi-
lar function to YSTR analysis in reducing coincidental
partial matches and narrowing the pool of true relatives
by implicating maternal lineage [19,20]. However,
sequencing of mtDNA presents a greater technical chal-
lenge and expense than YSTR analysis, so routine
mtDNA testing may be impractical [21].
Statistical analysis: identity by state
The identity-by-state (IBS) statistical approach infers
genetic similarity based on the number of matching
markers between two profiles, regardless of how indivi-
dual markers are inherited. When using the IBS
approach, analysts rank matches based on the highest
number of matched markers to the lowest number, with
a full match being 26 shared alleles [18,20]. For familial
searching, this approach can prioritize an entire data set
of potential relatives without complicated statistical ana-
lysis. However, the IBS approach does not take into
account allele frequency, population size and other fac-
tors that affect the likelihood that two samples are
genetically related [18]. For instance, parent-child rela-
tionships are easily detected when two profiles share at
least one allele at each marker; however, the IBS
between a parent and child could be as low as 13 of 26
shared alleles and thus could be falsely excluded from a
candidate partial match list [20]. In California, software
for familial searching generates partial matches using
the IBS strategy, limiting the pool to candidate profiles
sharing 15 or more (of 26 possible) alleles with the evi-
dence profile, which must be a single-source profile [9].
This IBS target will likely be adjusted as the database
expands and as the software develops (M Chamberlain,
Deputy Attorney General, California Department of Jus-
tice, personal communication).
Statistical analysis: likelihood ratio
In familial searching, a likelihood ratio (or kinship
index) compares the probability of two profiles’ being
from related sources to the probability of the two pro-
files’ being unrelated. Calculating a likelihood ratio takes
into account all 13 markers typed in a CODIS profile,
the allele frequencies of the 26 detected alleles and
potential mutation events at each marker. The likeli-
hood ratio can vary based on the frequency of each
marker across the population, the number of loci com-
pared in the profiles and the prior odds of the alleged
relationship [19]. The likelihood ratio calculation allows
investigators to rank the individuals within the pool of
candidates according to the probability that the evidence
profile is related to the CODIS profile [3,18,20]. In 2008,
SWGDAM recommended that a threshold likelihood
ratio be used to calculate kinship [7]. To carry out Col-
orado’s familial search policy, the Denver District
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designed software that combines IBS and likelihood
ratios for use in familial searches [11]. Virginia’s autho-
rities adopted the software developed in Colorado to
conduct familial searches in Virginia [10]. In Texas,
familial searches are conducted using software that was
developed by the University of North Texas, which uses
a combination of IBS and likelihood ratio and includes
YSTR analyses [12]. California uses software to generate
likelihood ratios for all profiles from the IBS screen
(sharing 15 or more alleles). The software returns pro-
files above an established likelihood ratio threshold and
can be used to rank candidate profiles by statistical
relatedness [9].
Retesting with additional markers with a focus on rare
alleles
To improve the reliability of hits from familial searches,
investigators can type markers in addition to the stan-
dard 13 STRs [18]. Additional markers could improve
the precision of inferences of familial relatedness and
might also unveil rare alleles. All STR alleles vary, with
different frequencies occurring among different popula-
tions. Close relatives are more likely than two random
individuals to share rare alleles. If an evidence profile
happens to exhibit a rare allele at one of the thirteen
STRs, investigators may choose to first focus the investi-
gation on partial match candidates who also carry the
rare allele.
Public record review
Traditional police investigation of public records may
support or refute suspected biological relationships in a
candidate partial match list. Such public records review
is costly but can reduce concerns about unwarranted
investigation of families unrelated to the perpetrator of
the crime [11]. In Colorado, crime investigators are
expected to attempt to verify familial relations through
background checks of the partial match individual and
family members using public resources, such as court
and jail records, criminal history checks, investigative
reports and vital records [11].
Ethical, legal and social issues
Familial searching approaches can either positively or
negatively affect individuals, families, certain racial
groups and society in general, inevitably raising ethical
and privacy questions. Proponents of familial searching
assert that the potential to improve public safety and
ensure justice outweigh any costs to individual and
family privacy, especially if mechanisms are in place to
minimize harm [5,22,23].
Between 2003 and 2010, the United Kingdom success-
fully used familial searching to obtain convictions in 19
cases [24]. To address ethical challenges, the United
Kingdom established the National DNA Database Ethics
Group, which monitors all ethical and human rights
concerns with respect to searches [25]. This ethics
group covers a wide range of topics, including familial
searching as well as general privacy and ethical issues
associated with the use and storage of DNA, and makes
policy recommendations, such as whether to implement
routine Y-chromosome testing [26]. Similarly, California
formed a Familial Search Committee (FSC) comprised
of law enforcement officials, attorneys and scientists
within the California Department of Justice, which
reviews familial search requests submitted by law enfor-
cement (M Chamberlain, Deputy Attorney General,
California Department of Justice, personal communica-
tion). The members review the progress of cases and
provide legal and ethical checkpoints at major steps in
the investigation. The California FSC requires law enfor-
cement officials to sign a Memorandum of Understand-
ing stating that they will follow through with their
request and with the conditions of approval of familial
searching [9].
Family and personal privacy
Opponents of familial searching warn that, as a by-pro-
duct of familial searches in an investigation, family
members may learn information about relatives that was
previously unknown to them [27]. For example, family
members may not be aware that their relative was
arrested or convicted of a crime. Familial search investi-
gations may also reveal a genetic relationship previously
unknown to the individuals [27,28]. The revelation of
such facts could have a profound emotional impact on
entire families, potentially leading to domestic violence
or estrangement [5]. To mitigate the potential for harm
precipitated by such incidental findings, familial search-
ing policies may impose verification of familial relation-
ships through the public records as a prerequisite for
questioning the suspects uncovered in the familial
search, such as the requirement contained in Colorado’s
familial search policy [11]. Advocates have noted that
familial searching minimally affects an individual’ss e n s e
of privacy and liberty because individuals investigated as
a result of a familial search remain unaware that they
are under police scrutiny until law enforcement officials
identify further cause for interrogation [22,23].
Abuse of power
Because familial searching is intended to develop a sus-
pect pool when conventional investigation of available
evidence has not created leads, it by design opens the
investigation of potentially innocent individuals based
on their genetic material [29]. Some argue that familial
searching carries a risk for increased genetic surveillance
in that law enforcement officials may investigate indivi-
duals primarily on the basis of their genetic information
[3,30,31]. Concerns about genetic surveillance are exa-
cerbated by the additional risk of abuse of power by law
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policies permit familial searching only after all other
investigative options have been exhausted, law enforce-
ment officials may use familial searching as a routine
part of their investigations. Routine familial searching
may aggravate public perceptions that law enforcement
exploits CODIS to troll for suspects and invade indivi-
duals’ privacy [32]. To date no such reports of abuse
have surfaced. Conversely, some people believe it is
their duty as citizens to cooperate and assist with law
enforcement, and proposed tools to solve crime typically
garner public support. To limit the abuse of power,
California, Texas and Virginia authorize familial
searches only after investigators have exhausted all other
leads [9,10,12]. The Colorado policy allows the Colorado
Bureau of Investigation to conduct routine familial
searches and permits crime investigators to follow up
on potential matches obtained from a search [11].
Constitutionality
Legal scholars have taken various stances on the consti-
tutionality of familial searches. Their opinions are based
on two core questions about when a search occurs and
whether a search is reasonable. The Fourth Amendment
provides protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures [33]. US courts continue to debate the Fourth
Amendment implications of using a DNA sample for
purposes beyond the initial creation of a profile
[32,34,35]. The collection of physical biological material
for forensic analysis has been termed a search under the
Fourth Amendment [36]. In familial searching, scholars
have posited that the timing of the search affects who
may be considered the subject of a Fourth Amendment
search. Consideration of who is subject to a search may
shape how courts and legal experts assess the privacy
considerations implicated by the search and whether law
enforcement officials may conduct a reasonable search
based on the progress of an investigation. In some juris-
dictions, a search warrant issued on the basis of a show-
ing of probable cause is required to conduct a
reasonable search. In others, the justification for a
search can be established with reasonable suspicion or
suspicionless cause (L Dame, personal communication,
class lecture entitled “Familial searches of DNA data-
bases and the Fourth Amendment,” Spring 2011, Duke
Genome Sciences and Policy Capstone course, Duke
University). In some instances, suspicionless searches
are allowed on a case-by-case basis, with courts weigh-
ing individual privacy rights against the government’s
interest in protecting the public from crime. To ensure
that a search is reasonable, courts may apply the balan-
cing test to weigh individuals’ rights protecting them
from unreasonable search and seizure against the gov-
ernment’s duty to preserve public safety.
Some scholars posit that, because biological materials
are not collected directly from relatives under investiga-
tion during a familial search, the legal search occurs
when the low-stringency DNA database search is run,
such that investigators effectively include relatives of
convicted offenders and arrestees in a database search.
From this perspective, in a familial search, CODIS offen-
ders’ biological relatives may be considered the indivi-
duals being searched and thus are protected under the
Fourth Amendment. Others argue that the legal search
occurs during the creation of the profile: that is, when
the sample is collected, tested or entered into the data-
base (L Dame, personal communication, class lecture
entitled “Familial searches of DNA databases and the
Fourth Amendment,” Spring 2011, Duke Genome
Sciences and Policy Capstone course, Duke University).
From this perspective, as long as law enforcement offi-
cials properly obtain a genetic sample during a search of
an offender, subsequent testing and analysis of the DNA
may not be protected by the Fourth Amendment [37].
Because investigators typically use familial searching
when existing leads do not point to a specific suspect, a
familial search may require justification for suspicionless
cause. Some scholars propose that only crimes that pose
a substantial threat to public safety warrant the use of
familial searching [3,5]. California, Texas and Virginia
choose to restrict familial searching only for violent or
sexual crimes because the heinous nature of these
crimes compels a strong response from law enforcement
officials [9,10,12]. On the other hand, because many
criminals commit minor crimes before they engage in
major violent crimes, the use of familial searching to
investigate lesser crimes could be justified to prevent
future felonies. Colorado does not limit familial search-
ing to violent crimes, but requires that crime investiga-
tors submit written requests to conduct familial
searches when the crime under investigation poses a
substantial public safety concern and conventional
investigative approaches have been exhausted [11]. Col-
orado also authorizes nontestimonial identification
orders, allowing law enforcement agencies to obtain
DNA samples based on suspicion lower than probable
cause. Courts may issue nontestimonial identification
orders for the collection of various specimens, including
fingerprints, blood, urine and hair [38]. Colorado policy-
makers may extend nontestimonial identification orders
to allow law enforcement to conduct familial searches in
cases without individualized suspicion.
While convicted felons may be profiled and searched
nationwide, state policies differ with regard to whether
arrestees and juveniles may be profiled, whether they
continue to have a reduced expectation of privacy after
their release from incarceration, or whether they can be
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that arrested individuals and juveniles may reasonably
expect to have decreased privacy during the time of
arrest and therefore may be included in DNA databases.
Others posit that arrestees’ presumed innocence and
juveniles’ minority status might necessitate greater priv-
acy protections than those granted to convicted felons
[22,36]. The ongoing debates about the creation and
retention of arrestee and juvenile profiles may extend to
familial searching. California’s State DNA Index System
(SDIS) separates the arrestee index from felons’ profiles,
so familial searches of California’sS D I Se x c l u d ea r r e s t -
ees [9]. Virginia, Texas and Colorado, on the other
hand, include both offenders and arrestees in their SDIS
familial searches [10-12].
Because familial searching has not yet been challenged
in the courts, how US courts will assess the Fourth
Amendment implications of familial searching is
unknown [31,34,35]. Legal experts will continue to
debate the permissibility of familial searching under the
Fourth Amendment, but the parameters for allowing
familial searching will remain uncertain until the
Supreme Court addresses this issue.
Disparities in select populations
Familial searching has the potential to exacerbate the
racial bias already documented in the criminal justice
system [3,39,40]. Because of their disproportionately
high rates of arrests, prosecutions and convictions,
members of racial minority groups are significantly
overrepresented in CODIS. With the use of familial
searching, members of racial groups are searched in
proportion to their relative representation in the US jus-
tice system. It has been estimated that familial searching
could survey up to 17% of the total African American
population as opposed to only 4% of the Caucasian
population [37]. Despite the potential for disproportion-
ate scrutiny of racial minorities in familial searching,
victims of violent crimes are often members of racial
minority populations, such that improved conviction
rates achieved with the use of familial searching also
benefit those communities [41].
Maryland banned familial searching of the state-speci-
fic database as part of legislation to expand its DNA
databases to include arrestees of violent crimes because
of the disproportionate number of racial minorities sub-
ject to arrest [17]. In other words, legislators feared that
allowing familial searching of an arrestee database could
disproportionately focus law enforcement efforts on a
large group of people who are primarily defined by their
race, despite their never having committed a crime (S
Mercer, personal communication, class interview with
key informant on the Maryland decision to ban familial
searching, Spring 2011, Duke Genome Sciences and Pol-
icy Capstone course, Duke University).
State-by-state familial searching policies may also
result in a disparate focus by law enforcement officials
on families of low socioeconomic status. Investigations
involving familial searching presently are conducted
within a handful of states. Consequently, biological rela-
tives who live outside the state in which the crime was
committed will not be subject to searches of the state-
specific database. Because families of low socioeconomic
status tend to have decreased mobility, they are more
likely to live within the same state, city and/or town as
their relatives [42]. As a result of state-by-state familial
searching policies, families of low socioeconomic status
are searched and investigated more robustly than
families of high socioeconomic status.
Economic impact on laboratories and law enforcement
agencies
Data are needed to understand the actual impact of
familial searching on all facets of crime investigation.
Familial searching may burden crime laboratories, crime
investigators and the justice system in terms of cost and
time. Because familial searching will increase the num-
ber of suspects identified on the basis of DNA forensics,
law enforcement agencies may be burdened with an
increased workload, particularly when they are required
to investigate a broad suspect pool. Once a list of partial
matches is made, law enforcement must decide whether
to expend resources to retest samples for additional
markers and follow up on multiple leads.
Familial searching requires that evidence be retested
for additional markers and to review the results of a
search, thus increasing the workload of crime labora-
tories. Existing crime laboratory backlogs may worsen
with increased searching and retesting demands.
Because many crime laboratories prioritize high-profile
and violent crimes, familial search requests for violent
crimes may jump ahead of other backlogged DNA-based
cases [43].
Logistics and CODIS authority
The authority of the FBI to alter CODIS software is lim-
ited by the DNA Identification Act of 1994 [1]. This
federal law restricts the purpose of CODIS to the identi-
fication of suspects as opposed to the development of
investigative leads, presenting a potential hurdle to be
cleared before a national familial search platform can be
developed. Because familial searches are conducted at
the state level, challenges in coordinating data and com-
municating across jurisdictions persist. It remains
unclear whether CODIS software can be modified or
adapted to more efficiently yield leads or whether
authority must be granted by federal legislation.
Policy options
In implementing a familial search policy, there are sev-
eral options for determining when and how the
Kim et al. Investigative Genetics 2011, 2:22
http://www.investigativegenetics.com/content/2/1/22
Page 6 of 9approach is used, the scope of a search and how to nar-
row the suspect pool to eliminate coincidental genetic
matches. The six policy options outlined below might
be considered in an effort to (1) maximize the efficiency
of a system, (2) limit the burden on laboratories and law
enforcement, (3) address some of the aforementioned
impacts on society and families and (4) balance ethical
implications and individual rights with the duty of law
enforcement officials and agencies to carry out their
responsibilities and protect the public’s safety.
1. The FBI could be granted authorization to develop
software to search CODIS for biological relatives
CODIS software is not designed to perform familial
searches effectively, yet a national platform is the best
approach to ensure consistency across jurisdictions.
Consistent application of familial searching will require
standard tools to manage the pools of candidate sus-
pects and minimize both the burden on law enforce-
ment officials to investigate leads and the privacy
intrusion on families. Software designed to conduct
familial searches could incorporate both IBS and likeli-
hood ratio analyses to maximize efficiency. FBI officials
have indicated that they currently do not have the
authority to make such changes [17].
2. National policy could be established to type YSTR
markers for all prospective CODIS profiles
Routine analysis of YSTR markers when a CODIS pro-
file is initially typed would improve the efficiency of
familial searching by removing the need for retesting,
hence eliminating one of the analytical burdens on
laboratories. Individual states could develop policies for
retesting stored DNA samples for YSTR markers based
on their available resources and familial searching needs.
3. A national advisory consortium could be established to
guide the development of statistical tools for familial
searching
Scientists and policymakers are evaluating which statisti-
cal methods and analytical tools will efficiently limit the
pool of suspects without excluding the actual perpetra-
tor. As policies and technologies develop and as the
CODIS database expands, the statistical parameters for a
search will need to be reviewed and adjusted. Advice
from experts in relationship testing, statistics and popu-
lation genetics will be crucial for consistent application
of familial searching among the various population
pools across the United States. An advisory consortium
modeled on the DNA Advisory Board could guide the
establishment and revision of the statistical criteria used
to develop familial searching policies, both nationally
and state-by-state. Statistical tools, including the IBS
approach and likelihood ratios, can be used to rank par-
tial matches to optimize the likelihood that a match cor-
responds to a true biological relationship. However, an
advisory consortium may have limited authority to
enforce or regulate policy.
4. A national advisory consortium could be established to
review cases and serve an ethics advisory function in policy
implementation
Familial searching has raised ethical concerns because of
its potential to profile certain socioeconomic and minor-
ity groups disproportionately, alter family dynamics and
diminish individuals’ sense of liberty. The development
of an ethics oversight board is one option for ensuring
that the social and ethical implications of familial
searching are addressed and incorporated into policy
and decision-making. Federal policy-making bodies
could model an ethics advisory board upon California’s
Familial Search Committee and the UK Ethics Group.
A national advisory consortium would provide guidance
on the ethical boundaries and privacy concerns of familial
searching for states considering legislation and investigat-
ing ongoing cases. A national resource would provide a
broad perspective on nationwide trends and emerging
issues related to US Constitutional rights. Additionally, an
advisory consortium might address privacy concerns by
making recommendations regarding police investigation
approaches. Although policy could ultimately be left to the
discretion of individual law enforcement offices, a national
consortium could (a) recommend safeguards for when
partial match individuals’ identities may be disclosed to
law enforcement officials for further investigation or (b)
advise law enforcement regarding the kind of information
that may be disclosed to family members. An ethics advi-
sory consortium has limited authority to enforce or regu-
late policy. However, a national ethics advisory
consortium could provide guidance for review of familial
search policies or investigations.
5. States could determine for which crimes familial
searching is appropriate
States may individually apply the balancing test to deter-
mine whether law enforcement should use familial
searching routinely or on a case-by-case basis. Policy
makers may assess the circumstances for which to con-
duct a familial search by weighing the needs to (a) pre-
vent crime and protect the public interest and public
safety and (b) protect against the infringement of indivi-
dual privacy rights, avoid social ramifications (including
disproportionate profiling of racial minority popula-
tions), ameliorate impacts on families and limit the
potential financial and time burdens of familial search-
ing on individual crime laboratories and police depart-
ments. Additionally, by using familial searching only for
violent crimes, for example, law enforcement officials
could reduce unnecessary costs and save time while aid-
ing investigations of crimes that pose the most critical
threats to public safety.
Kim et al. Investigative Genetics 2011, 2:22
http://www.investigativegenetics.com/content/2/1/22
Page 7 of 96. States could determine whose DNA profiles can be used
to conduct a familial search
In addition to deciding when a familial search is appro-
priate, concerns also arise over whose DNA profiles can
be used for a familial search. Inclusion in a DNA data-
base is no longer limited to individuals convicted of vio-
lent crimes. Some critics of familial searching argue that
running familial searches of databases that include
arrestees may by default include searches of innocent
individuals whose privacy rights have not been dimin-
ished (as a convicted offenders’ rights have been)
[44,45]. Individual state policies may set different para-
meters for familial searches by narrowing or widening
them on the basis of categories of offenders. Such
searches may exclude arrestees or juveniles, thus limit-
ing the familial search to adult individuals with a docu-
mented diminished expectation of privacy. Conversely,
the search may include these categories to provide the
broadest scope.
Conclusion
Familial searching offers law enforcement a powerful
tool for apprehending criminals, revitalizing cold cases
and exonerating wrongfully convicted individuals. Devel-
opment of familial searching policies should take into
account open questions regarding the impact of familial
searching policies on select populations and how to
minimize personal intrusion on relatives of individuals
in the DNA database. As policies develop and jurisdic-
tions establish procedures, we will better understand the
societal impact of familial searching.
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